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Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International
Security
CHRISTOPHER P. TWOMEY
In the decade before the invasion of Iraq, the most important concepts in security
studies for an American policy audience were the revolution in military affairs and
transformation. Primarily due to the failures of that war and in Afghanistan and
broader problems in the Middle East, culture has replaced these in the attentions of
policymakers. Washington has been smitten by the idea that deeper understanding
of cultural issues can reduce policy failures and advance national interests. This mani-
fests most clearly in a range of recent policy documents from the Pentagon. Its recent
Quadrennial Defense Review introduces a two-page section on the topic by arguing,
‘Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also critical to
prevail in the long war and to meet 21st century challenges.’1 The document mentions
the importance of ‘cultural’ awareness a stunning 18 times. Consequently, the United
States military has moved to increase its support for regional specialists in uniform
(‘foreign area officers’ and their brethren), increased its support for language training,
and is reaching out widely for academic expertise.
A different, but related, change has occurred in the academy. If the 1980s were the
heyday of neorealism in international relations scholarship, by the late 1990s con-
structivism was laying siege to its dominance. Marked by important books edited
by Peter Katzenstein and written by Alexander Wendt,2 this period saw the ahistoric,
acultural approach of the previous generation of theorizing called into question.
Instead, constructivism’s proponents argued for the constitutive role of socially con-
structed identities and the importance of shared ideas and practices. A recent survey
of international relations professors has shown that constructivism is continuing its
rise in the field.3 Simply referring to this literature as ‘cultural’ in nature grossly over-
simplifies; beyond that, the constructivist literature prides itself on a degree of expli-
cit methodological rigor that was absent in earlier ‘area studies’ work and
problematizes such ideational constructs in ways earlier work did not. Nevertheless,
clearly this literature is calling for increased understanding of comparative culture.
Indeed, constructivism has provided something of a reprieve for area studies scholars
against the onslaught of highly abstract international relations theorizing.4
Thus, for those students of security studies who – like this author – have invested
in learning other languages and developing an understanding of other societies and
their customs, these ought be heady times. Yet, there is a puzzle in the various litera-
tures that use culture to examine security studies. On the one hand, those stressing the
importance of an organizationally derived military culture are eminently persuasive.5
Similarly, explanations of variation in national identity that depend on constructed,
ideational sources are also quite convincing.6 On the other hand, the middle
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ground between these two types of work, the core of what is captured under the rubric
of ‘strategic culture’, is flawed. This core takes national-level cultures and uses them
to explain tendencies in national ‘ways of war’ or grand strategies, an approach that
has great intuitive appeal.7 It has grown substantially, and some of its proponents
have engaged in vigorous and sophisticated defences of the methodological chal-
lenges it faces. Unfortunately, as a group, this literature is plagued with overdeter-
mined predictions (relative to simple, alternative theoretic approaches or material
conditions), by explaining universal practices, and – in some cases – by politicized
studies.
Strategic culture would potentially be valuable to a policymaker: if scholars can
provide a map of how different national cultures think about the use of force, how
they make war, etc., the promise for improving national security policy is great.
However, if this core area is flawed, than the applicability of culture to security
studies for policy relevant purposes will be much narrower. Given the renewed atten-
tion from policymakers on issues of culture, there is a danger that the scholarly accep-
tance of the other two areas – constructivism and organizational cultures – will offer
verisimilitude to the problematic, traditional strategic culture work and the policy
prescriptions drawn from it.
This article, then, has three aims. First, a typology of the various types of work
relating cultural causes to strategic effects is developed. Second, to persuade the
reader that there is a puzzle worth explaining, the relative merits of these various
bodies of work are evaluated. Studies of national identity and military-organizational
culture are shown to be strong and robust, yet the role of a similar independent vari-
able – culture – to other effects is shown to be tenuous. Thereafter, the article
explains this failure by identifying the reasons this pattern of validity in cultural
work in security studies – a lacuna between two flourishing research programs –
occurs.
Existing Work on Culture in Security Studies
How should one bound the literature under study here? This is not a trivial question;
the intersection between studies ‘cultural’ and those on ‘security’ is large. This article
will accept an expansive view and consider all research that addresses both. Through-
out, it will focus on the way that culture, as an independent variable, shapes security
behaviour, the dependent variable. (As such, it remains explicitly positivist in its
outlook, siding with Iain Johnston in his debates with Colin Gray.8) For analytic
clarity, it is useful to reserve the term strategic culture for a subset of this broader
field of research.
While there is much interesting sociological, anthropological, and organizational
work on the way in which various types of cultures form and are changed, that issue
will not be considered here. Those studies problematize culture itself, treating it as the
dependent variable. That is a worthy task, but not mine. Rather, this article will evalu-
ate the way different types of cultures shape issues in security studies.
As is discussed below, the range of strategic behaviour that culture has been used
to explain is quite large, ranging from the tactical predispositions of specific military
services, to broader strategic preferences of a nation or military, to the broadest



































national interests and international security norms. None of these are excluded from
the conceptual survey below, and indeed explaining the variation among the quality
of work across this spectrum of related literatures is the focus of this article.
Due to differences in both dependent and independent variables, I argue this
broad field can be divided usefully into three categories: the article begins discussing
those that draw upon military organizational cultures, then examines the core of tra-
ditional strategic culture work, and concludes with those that strive to explain
national (security) identities. Each of these has developed independently, although
there is some interaction, and intersection, among them. The next sections discuss
each in turn.
Military Culture and Operational Effects
At the lowest level of analysis, there is a literature that looks at organizational, rather
than national, cultures. This literature originates – or more precisely, builds on – the
rise of scholarly interest in organizations per se sparked by classic studies of bureauc-
racy.9 These are generally used to explain operational or even tactical preferences or
tendencies, instead of broader ‘ways of war’ or even grand strategies. Thus, it differs
in both independent and dependent variables from the literatures in sections below.
In one classic work in this field, Builder examines the different cultures within the
various military services within the United States that have shaped what sort of mili-
tary missions the services emphasize, and which they avoid.10 Legro has examined
the way in which specific military-organizational cultures shape what is considered
appropriate military strategy, looking at cases of chemical warfare, submarine
warfare against commerce, and strategic bombing in World War II.11 Kier links dom-
estic political debates to the strategic preferences of the military in France and Britain
before the same war.12 Hull argues that the nature of the German military, consist-
ently over nearly a hundred-year period, shaped its operational strategy regarding
slaughter and other forms of military extremism.13 Lynn Eden links the irrationally
large nuclear arsenals of the Cold War to biases that stem from organizational politics
within the scientific and analytic communities affiliated to the US Air Force that sys-
tematically underestimated the destructive potential of firestorms.14 King argues that
the density of the social groups making up the British officer corps lead to a particu-
larly efficient flexibility in implementing doctrine in operations, and contrasts that
with German and France.15 This author’s own work examines the way military
doctrines shape perception of military threats and assessment of the military balance
in Sino-American and Arab–Israeli conflicts.16
In each of these arguments, both the dependent variable and independent variable
are smaller in scale than in the ‘traditional’ strategic cultural literature. The indepen-
dent variable is typically clearly distinct from other literatures and focuses on cultural
factors within a particular organization: either a single nation’s military or a particular
service within it rather than on national cultural traits. Furthermore, while there is
some blurring at the edges on the dependent variable, this literature generally
explains a narrower form of policy than the ‘traditional’ strategic culture. These
works typically focus on tactical and operational practices rather than grand strategy.



































They are not predicting general competencies in broad areas of warfare, but rather
specific sorts of policy: avoidance of certain types of weapons (Legro), choice of
specific operational strategies (Kier), ignoring certain pieces of readily obtainable
data (Eden and Twomey), and conducting certain types of offensive operations
(Hull).
Culture and Grand Strategy: ‘Traditional’ Strategic Culture
The traditional strategic culture literature connects deeply held, national cultural
practices and beliefs to the selection of grand strategy, both in its military and politi-
cal elements. This is a large, multifaceted literature. The early work focused typically
on the military elements of a grand strategy. It generally addressed effects that were
more large-scale in nature than tactics, although the line between operational strategy
and military facets of a grand strategy is admittedly imprecise.
Jack Snyder and Colin Gray pioneered this traditional literature in the late
1970s.17 Snyder argued for the importance of strategic culture in the nuclear realm:
Strategic culture can be defined as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional
responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national stra-
tegic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share
with each other with regard to nuclear strategy. In the area of strategy, habitual
behavior is largely cognitive behavior.18
For Snyder, these ideational constructs and received history predisposed the
Soviets to an offensive and preemptive form of nuclear doctrine.
In his early work, Gray suggests that the (poor) quality of American strategic
analysis in general is a function of its particular strategic culture. He argued that, his-
torically, the United States has had an ‘astrategic’ strategic culture. However, starting
from the 1960s, he charted a shift to a more thoughtful, although still misguided in his
assessment, form of analysis. This was characterized by an optimistic view of stra-
tegic stability and the utility of arms control, and a pessimism regarding the ability
to control nuclear war (and therefore to plan for it).19 In later writings, Gray steps
back to describe a broad view of the role of culture, arguing that it provides the
context for strategic action.20
This style of argument – connecting culture to specific, broad military strategies
or practices – has many adherents among contemporary Sinologists; for instance,
Newmeyer explains the Chinese backwardness in airpower to Taoist and imperial
era cultural norms.21 Pillsbury links Sun Tsu’s writings to contemporary Chinese stra-
tegic practices.22 Whiting stresses the emphasis in China on preemption and seizing
the initiative.23
More generally, however, the recent strategic culture literature has broadened
somewhat to explain perceptions regarding utility of violence in general for achieving
national aims, the merits of multilateralism versus unilateralism, and the importance
of international law for individual countries. Such studies investigate the cultural
origins of a liberal versus an offensive realist outlook on world politics, for
instance.24 This work is a bit broader than that Snyder and Gray pioneered: rather



































than addressing the way that military force is used within a particular conflict, this
literature steps back to assess the sources of choices about political-military strategies
for thriving within international affairs. Nevertheless, it links national cultures to
grand strategic choices. If the earlier strategic culture literature focused on the mili-
tary side of grand strategy, much of the contemporary work centres on the political, or
political-military, side of grand strategy.
This burgeoning literature increasingly dominates contemporary publications on
strategic culture. Some of its earliest work focused on the distinctive Japanese and
German foreign policies in the cold war.25 Building on this foundation, other work
in the strategic culture tradition is notable for its positivist methodological practices.
In Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,26
Johnston lays out a research design that allows for replicability and reduces the pro-
spect for politicized or selective coding of any particular cultural trait.27 He argues
that traditional views of China as a legalistic, pacifist culture are flawed. Other scho-
lars of China also emphasize similar elements of Chinese strategic culture: Scobell,
too finds evidence for a rather ‘offensive realist’ form of behaviour, albeit one
concealed behind a more benign rhetoric. It is, he says, ‘a worldview that rationalizes
the use of force, even when used in an offensive capacity, as a purely defensive
measure’.28
Today, much work continues in this vein. For instance, Matlary and Meyer in sep-
arate articles suggest that an emerging European-wide strategic culture will in general
be predisposed against the use of force and in favour of multilateralism.29 Legro
charts the change in American views regarding international involvement more
generally.30 Others compare the evolution of Canadian and Australian views on
these issues.31
In all these cases, the dependent variables exist at a broad level: conceptions of
the best combinations of political and military tools to achieve national interests in
the international arena. The imputed source of this behaviour is a culture that
resides within the nation as a whole.
Constructing National Identity
Finally, a third, large literature studies the way that culture shapes national interests at
a broad level. Works in this area address issues such as the desirability of close
relations with different areas of the world, what geographic areas are considered
part of the national territory and what are not, and what is a nation’s purpose in
the international sphere. These dependent variables are even larger in scale than
those considered in the traditional strategic culture literatures (although again,
there is some overlap). Rather than focusing on what geopolitical strategies might
best achieve a given set of interests, this literature explains the cultural sources of
those interests. The strategic culture literature centres on the strategy, whereas the
national identity literature describes the goals that strategy serves. The sources of
culture used as explanatory variables in this literature include both those that
reside within a nation, as in the strategic culture literature, but also those that trans-
cend a single nation-state and exist in some manifestation of international society.



































This is one manifestation of the broader rise of the constructivism, drawing on meth-
odology from sociology and sharing some of critical theory’s concerns about general-
izable theory.32
Several works fall in this literature. Hopf dissects the nature of Russian and Soviet
identity with regard to its relations with other countries on the basis of their Slavic
ethnicity, adherence to communist ideals, and great power stature.33 Mendeloff
describes Russia’s perceptions of the Baltics as internal to the Russian identity at
the end of the cold war.34 Brown describes how identity politics have been shaped
in Taiwan, and Zhao discusses the importance of that in China’s own national iden-
tity.35 More broadly, Risse-Kappen argues for the importance of ‘a modified domestic
structure approach incorporating long-held worldviews embedded in the political
culture’.36 Scholars have found similar explanations for America’s predisposition
to export democracy, and Maoist China’s propensity to export revolution.37 Others
also emphasize the importance of normative sources of territorial disputes.38 Craw-
ford traces the way moral debates shaped many national views about the merits of
colonialism.39 Other scholars also examine the role of international social norms
on shaping the practices of international affairs regarded as commonplace throughout
the international system (indeed, that constitute the system).40
Thus, the literatures on culture in security studies are wide-ranging. The three lit-
eratures that are mentioned above constitute relatively distinct groupings, albeit with
some grey areas at the margins. The chart below represents these visually. A large
number of authors working on the role of culture in international security are
located on the chart according to the nature of her or his research. Each is coded
by the location of the culture s/he examines as the independent variable and by
the sort of effect that culture is predicted to have.
As suggested in the three sections above, these scholars cluster rather than being
uniformly distributed across the range of possibilities. Thus, there is a distinct
grouping circled in the upper left of the chart that corresponds to the organizational
culture theorists. They all are located near the top of the chart, as befits their narrow
independent variable. The coherence of these theorists on the dependent variable
side of the equation is lower, although there is a core focusing narrowly on tactical
and operational doctrine. The authors circled on the bottom right compose the
national interests literature. The culture in their independent variables is typically
at the level of states or the international system, and the dependent variable they
are explaining is primarily in the realm of national interests. Finally, in the
centre of the chart is the core strategic culture literature. Its independent variable
is similar to that of the bottom right literature and is found at the level of nation-
states. However, the dependent variable is centred on explaining nation’s grand-
strategic choices.
Undoubtedly, the chart could be populated further; indeed, some of the articles
cited in this article are not included. However, it is unlikely that the clustering
effect would disappear. Similarly, one could identify subsets of these literatures, or
find other ways to parse the distribution. Yet the core similarities identified in the
sections above do provide a useful typology for this broad area of the role of
culture in the study of international security.



































Having categorized the culture in strategic studies field into three distinct litera-
tures, this article now turns to briefly assess the quality of each.
Evaluation
This section argues that the middle grouping, which traditionally is viewed as the
locus of ‘strategic culture’, is flawed. Three primary concerns limit the utility of
the traditional strategic cultural literature. First, many of its predictions are overdeter-
mined. Second, there are substantial empirical failings of existing strategic cultural
work. Third, there remains an unresolved epistemological debate about the role of
causality in the study of strategic culture. In contrast, this section also highlights
FIGURE 1
CULTURE IN STRATEGIC STUDIES
WHERE DOES IT RESIDE, AND WHAT DOES IT INFLUENCE?
Note: The author would like to recognize Elizabeth Stone and, particularly, Anne Clunan, for their assistance in conceiv-
ing and developing this chart.
Sources: In addition to studies cited elsewhere in this article, the following are referenced here: Stephen Van Evera, ‘The
Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, in Steven E. Miller (ed.), Military Strategy and the Origins
of the First World War: An International Security Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Barry
R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984); Barry R. Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power’, International Secur-
ity, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of
Peace, 1812-22 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Anne L. Clunan, Reconstructing Grandeur: Identity and the Sources of
Russian Security Policy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, forthcoming); David C. Kang,
China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007).



































the merits of the other sorts of work highlighted in the chart above, and concludes by
noting a telling shift away from strategic culture by some of its earliest proponents.
Overdetermined Outcomes
The traditional strategic culture theories frequently fail to offer novel, replicable
insights. Some make predictions that are consistent with existing theoretical para-
digms, such as realism, or a particular variant of it – offensive realism.41 For
instance, as has been much commented upon, Johnston and Scobell find that China
behaves . . . just as neorealism would predict!42 A Chinese cultural realism may be
accurate, but there are likely many explanations for it. Similarly, others emphasize
a culturally derived practice of strategic deception, as if that too did not have ration-
alist foundations.43
At a related level, studies of postwar Japanese pacifism have served as an import-
ant foundation for this literature.44 However, several authors have highlighted the
explicability of such policies given Japan’s unique geo-strategic position during
the cold war: an island nation with a superpower ally.45 These studies find both Japa-
nese cold war behaviour and its recent reforms to be entirely consistent with various
forms of realist behaviour.46
Others make very broad-level characterizations that are easily explained by
geography and material conditions. For instance, Kang’s recent book argues that
Korea and Vietnam, among others, are comfortable with Chinese leadership of the
Asian international system for cultural reasons.47 Although this book is admirable
for its call to focus more attention on the specifics of Asian international affairs,
this empirical claim is one that realists have no trouble explaining: weak states
near strong ones are prone to bandwagoning.48
For instance, Snyder argues that ideational constructs and received history pre-
disposed the Soviets to an offensive and preemptive form of nuclear doctrine
(Whiting makes the same claim for China, albeit in conventional terms).49 While
such a predisposition would certainly be relevant to policy, the historic source of
the culture in the Russian case – frequent invasion – is a common trait and not
one that seems particularly unique. Consider the current American ‘predisposition’
to offensive and preemptive, or rather preventive, war; this was the result of a single
attack of moderate scale. If strategic culture is that malleable, it is likely not particu-
larly useful as an explanatory variable. Indeed, some would argue that the post-9/11
era is not particularly unique in American history. If this is the case, and if the vastly
different histories of the United States and Russia lead to similar historic tendencies
at this level of military grand strategy, again the utility of the strategic cultural
approach must be questioned.50 Further, if Russia, China, and the United States
all exhibit this trait, why must we rely on nationally based, cultural explanations
to understand it?
In another cases, the United States is said to be good at naval warfare or it tends to
favour technology over manpower. (National preferences for attritional warfare
would also fall into this category.) Again, material explanations would seem
adequate, and more parsimonious, explanations for such tendencies.



































Still other articles focus on a nation’s belief in its own uniqueness or distinctive-
ness alone.51 However, since most nations believe this, and the implication of this is a
banal admonition to learn more about other cultures, this is not particularly construc-
tive. Finally, some address issues of the utility of force in general, or specifically with
regard to offensive, defensive, or signalling purposes.52 However, shifts in percep-
tions of the utility of force often seem to swing well beyond the confines of individual
national cultures.53
In all these cases, strategic culture is either explaining overdetermined variation
or – through lack of comparative work – making predictions based on unique cul-
tural variables for behaviours that are commonplace in the international system. In
neither case is this literature as a whole offering useful policy prescriptions. Strategic
culture, to be successful, should make unique predictions, particularly given its
onerous demands violating the goal of parsimony in social science.
Empirical Failures
In a number of instances where the strategic culture literature does make unique pre-
dictions, they simply fail to accord with the historic record. The review above high-
lighted the proliferation of articles on a legalistic and less aggressive strategic culture
in various European states.54 However, when the expectations of that literature are
compared to what is actually occurring in defence policy (rather than pundits’ rheto-
ric) in these states, the behaviour is found to be significantly consistent with structural
realism:
[T]he Europeans are hard balancing in the traditional realist way of balancing
internally and externally to generate military capability. Though Europe has
decreased its defense spending since the end of the Cold War, the wealthier
European states have increasingly oriented their defense spending on capabili-
ties that are analogous to those of the United States. They are emulating the
capabilities of the most potent power. And the European states have balanced
externally: under the auspices of the European Union, they have assembled a
military coalition with both regional and global aspirations.55
Similarly, reading Gray’s evaluation of the US ‘astrategic culture’ today, one is
struck at how narrowly he characterizes the broader flow of strategic debates in the
nuclear era in the United States. These views certainly represented one view in
Washington (and elsewhere), but never did these go uncontested nor were these
strategic ideas widely implemented by military practitioners.56 That is, this was
but one strategic culture competing for acceptance in the United States at the time.
The article returns to this important theme below.
This author has conducted a pair of studies investigating the potential for strategic
culture to explain contemporary Chinese foreign policy in two areas: North Korea
policy and nuclear strategy.57 In both areas, it is clear there are a range of different
strategic themes that are deeply held in Chinese culture that might plausibly shape
Chinese behaviour in these cases concerning preferences such as first strikes, toler-
ance of hierarchy in international affairs, preference for defensive strategies in



































general, etc. However, it is also clear from that research that these themes have not
shaped Chinese policy in these two areas in any meaningful way. These should be
easy tests for strategic culture, and the approach’s failures here are damning. Other
studies of Chinese and East Asian strategic culture also come up wanting: Kang’s
survey of East Asian international relations from this perspective has been subject
to empirical critiques.58
While these failings are significant, they do highlight an important point that often
goes under-appreciated: strategic culture work can be subject to three-cornered tests.
It can be falsified. It is to the approach’s credit that this is the case.59 However, the
results of these tests are not inspiring.
Strategic Culture: Causal or Context?
Gray admonishes scholars to treat ‘strategic culture as context’. Again, this has enor-
mous intuitive appeal, and many cosmopolitan analysts would echo an appeal for
added awareness of global differences. However, this is still leaves unexplained
how one might benefit from understanding this context. While polarized arguments
about positivism and interpretivism are indeed not constructive, assertions that
‘what we are really trying to generate, or must at least content ourselves with, is
some modicum of “explicative understanding”‘dodge the issue of whether strategic
culture can be used predictively.60 It is eminently plausible that culture might legit-
imate some behaviour and delegitimate others. However, this bromide should be used
to make contingent prescriptions if it is actually true. Specifically what choices for
which nations are beyond the pale? This sort of explicit statement of cultural
effects is rarely done.
Indeed, leading practitioners would like to have it both ways. For Gray, the
specific forms of behaviour that are constrained or shaped by this context are extre-
mely broad: ‘For example, for reasons that one can at least ultimately call cultural, the
United States is relatively poor at the conduct of special operations, whereas Israel,
Britain, and the former USSR, are relatively competent.’61 Later in the same piece,
he writes that German and Russian strategic cultures limit their excellence at
surface warfare at sea. These general statements strongly imply predictive con-
clusions. However, such broad-brush statements are easily explained by the material
constraints of the nations in question, a point that Gray does not dispute. Further,
Gray himself argues that in other cases, similar scale competencies can be changed:
But, it is not much of an exaggeration to claim that the twentieth was Britain’s
continental century. The point of the British illustration is to suggest that
reasonably well-led states have strategic cultures that are adaptable to chan-
ging, and often deeply unwelcome, political and strategic contexts.62
Here, Gray’s writing is internally inconsistent. He is strongly suggesting a constrain-
ing, and therefore explanatory role, for strategic culture, while at the same time pre-
senting his findings as descriptive and malleable. Further, as discussed in a previous
section, given the malleability of these cultures in Gray’s eyes, and the availability of



































alternate explanations, the utility of culturally based explanations for these competen-
cies seems limited.
If strategic culture is not capable of being used to predict likely future policy of
actors, then its leading proponents should be very explicit about this, and indeed
should criticize those who attempt to do so. Rather than doing so, the more philo-
sophic contributions in these literatures skirt the issue by welcoming the attention
from Washington today, and criticizing positivist polemicists at the same time.63
Washington is not interested in strategic culture because it edifies policymakers
about dead history. The attraction is the promise of better understanding of how
tomorrow’s world works. If the proponents of strategic culture truly believe they
cannot contribute in that regard, they should be public in their rejection of policy-
makers’ interest.
Evolution in Original Generation of Scholars
Indeed, as we consider the policy applicability of strategic cultural work, it is inter-
esting that a number of its most prominent early academic proponents have shifted in
one direction or another. This is evidence, circumstantial to be sure, of limitations in
the literature’s approach. Snyder has moved toward a more anthropological set of
approaches to culture and broadened away from explaining narrow strategic
choices to issues of more general war-proneness.64 Johnston finds more value in
studying the contribution of supranational forms of culture to security studies.65
Gray remains supportive of the original concept, although at times he too counsels
deep caution about both social science’s applicability to the topic and its utility to
policymakers. A series of quotes from a recent article of Gray’s highlight his own
epistemological pessimism:
I suspect that scholarship on strategic culture . . . is bound to fail when it ven-
tures far beyond our culture-bound common sense and positivistically seeks a
certain general wisdom. . . .
I admit that it is more than moderately difficult to design a theory of strategic
culture if the elusive beast, culture, is both input and output, presumed cause
and presumed consequence. But, so what! . . .
Practical people, a category that should include strategists, will ask that most
brutally direct of questions, ‘so what?’ So what do we do with greater self-,
and other-, cultural understanding? Culture matters greatly, but so do the
other dimensions of war, peace, and strategy.66
Gray does not propose an answer to the damning ‘so what?’ question he poses. His
pessimism about our ability to make use of ‘traditional’ strategic culture ought
sound a cautionary note to policymakers and analysts alike. Without something
approaching a general theory (probabilistic, to be sure), the insights derived from
this literature are likely to be edifying, but of limited utility to policymakers.
It is instructive that those who have addressed this topic with the most social
science rigor or who have engaged in its defence the longest, have themselves



































shifted their position on its applicability to policymaking. Unfortunately, recent
entrants to the field have too often ignored this shift.
Value at the Peripheries of Strategic Culture
The above critiques centre on the middle strand in the literature as identified in the
previous section (the cultural sources of political and military grand strategies, i.e.,
the traditional strategic culture literature). The other literatures, those based on organ-
izational cultures and those explaining national interests, are much less vulnerable to
these critiques.
In the former literature, the predictions offered are distinct from those made by
realist or other materialist focused approaches. Indeed, some form of a Waltzian
neorealism is generally taken as the explicit foil of those works.67 In each case, the
predicted – and observed – behaviour deviates from those predicted by a materialist,
realist conception but accords with the military-organizational culture’s prediction.
These are each relatively strong ‘three cornered’ tests, in Lakatosian terms, empha-
sizing the methodological rigor of this body of work.68 For instance, Keir outlines
domestic political structures that are likely to impede optimal strategy formulation,
and Legro points to organizational practices that would proscribe certain sorts of mili-
tary tactics; in both these cases the ‘rational’ strategy is the foil.69 It is rare that this is
done explicitly in the core strategic culture literatures, perhaps because scholars in
that tradition are often comparativists specializing in a single country and area
studies experts rather than specialists in the (comparative) study of grand strategy
or security studies.70 Furthermore, the policy implications in this literature are
often explicit: organizations will have specifiable predispositions, and competitors
can adjust their policy accordingly.
While systematically evaluating the literature on cultural sources of national
interests goes well beyond the aspirations of this paper, several factors attest to its
quality. It is essentially the core of paradigmatic constructivist literature, whose jus-
tified rise within the field was charted at the outset of the article.71 While this is not to
suggest by any means that this literature is accepted as dominant, its methodological
rigor and clear implications set it apart from other critical approaches. While the
strands of constructivism that question the degree to which ideational factors can con-
strain material power are heavily contested, those describing national interests are
much more widely accepted. In particular, the meticulous empirical grounding of
characterizations of national interest in works by authors such as Hopf and Brown
provides a robustness to their coding that is lacking in much of the strategic cultural
work.72 Ofttimes strategic culture work lacks the self-conscious attention to method-
ology that has allowed constructivism to flourish. Instead, the core variable of a
nation’s strategic culture incorporates contemporary domestic politics, economic
factors, and other factors without precision about which matters under what
circumstances.73
Similarly, rigor in discussing the ways in which culture is conveyed and changes
across time is critical for assessing is contributions to policy in different eras. This is a
hallmark of the best work on national identity formation.74 Cultural change is



































problematized, and its repositories – elites, educational systems, narratives in litera-
ture or other media – are made explicit. Such precision about definitions and an expli-
cit methodology for coding is vital for knowledge cumulation and the replicability of
findings across different researchers.
Thus, this article has painted a picture of robust work at the edge of what is
traditionally considered strategic culture, with weaker work at the core of it. What
then accounts for this lacuna in the utility of culture for understanding security?
The final section offers explores several answers.
Explaining Variation in the Utility of Culture to Security Studies
Several important differences among these various bodies of literature exist. This
final section argues that differences in two factors cause this pattern of a useful per-
imeter of the literature with a weaker centre. One pertains to the independent variable,
the other to the dependent variable. In the former, the number of competing cultural
themes varies across the different literatures. That is, the different repositories of
culture have different degrees of contestation regarding their cultural norms.
Second, the relevance and intensity of the crucible of international competition
varies across the literatures, allowing other factors to dominate the various dependent
variables in some cases. Together these pressures interact, squeezing the strategic
culture literature and greatly reducing its explanatory power.
Multiple Repositories of Culture
While each body of work draws on socially held, ideational constructs, the relevant
social groups are different for each of the literatures in ways that matter for the influ-
ence that culture might have. A single organization’s culture, particularly a rigid and
hierarchical organization like a military, is likely to be particularly cohesive and
unified. Organizations create standard operating procedures to function effectively,
and have explicit and formalized means of enforcing conformity (promotion, exclu-
sion, education, etc.) that nations lack. This will make identifying and characterizing
the culture of an organization much easier for the analyst. It also means that a single
culture can monopolize the ideational input to decisions and perceptions, rather than
having to compete with multiple competing strands of cultural identity.
In contrast, most nations have a plethora of different national cultural themes
that compete and interact throughout different elements of society. These are unlikely
to coalesce on issues of national security. Rather, multiple voices will compete in
identifying the ‘true’ heritage of a national strategic culture, and leaders can
choose among these to legitimate choices taken for other reasons.75 Even in cases
where one strand of national culture is powerful, its dominance is likely to be less
pronounced than a military organizational culture, where organizational structures,
promotions opportunities, etc. can reify its unity. This should lead the effects of a
military-organizational culture to be more clear-cut and more pronounced than for
the other forms of (national) culture that might affect security studies issues.
While this helps to explain the differences between the military-organizational
culture literature and the traditional strategic culture literature, the constructivist



































literature on national identity formation also looks at national culture as its source.
Should it not then suffer the same limitations as the traditional strategic culture lit-
erature? To some extent, the answer is simply ‘yes.’ When evaluating the construc-
tivist literature on national identity formation, however, one is struck by the
modesty of claims and the awareness of competing threads of identity. For instance,
this literature typically emphasizes the existence of multiple competing threads of
culture in existence at any one time, competing with each other for adherents as they
change their own nature over time. Simply, contestation of such social identities is
central to most sophisticated descriptive accounts of culture.76 Hopf, one of the
finest examples of this field, identifies five different themes in his evaluation of
Soviet identity in 1955 and four in 1999.77 His restraint in synthesizing these is
frustrating to many a reader, but likely a truer representation of reality than the
alternative.
Beyond that, and in part due to this point, the constructivist literature on national
identity is predominantly explanatory rather than predictive. The authors working
in this vein typically eschew making firm or even probabilistic predictions about
the future. Some in this literature avoid prioritizing the different sources of identity,
rather being content with identifying the full panoply of sources. Others would
emphasize precisely the historic contingency of the development of a particular
nation’s identity, noting the challenges in taking one particular explanation
beyond the case for which it was developed. Thus, although this literature does
achieve success, it is success on its own, narrow terms. Indeed, the series of quota-
tions cited above from Gray’s 2007 work suggests he is heading in that direction,
but he would not go as far as to explicitly exclude any predictive utility, as do
some constructivists.78 But this is precisely the danger: if strategic culture theorists
are on the same ‘contingent’, context-dependent methodological ground that con-
structivists occupy, then they need to acknowledge that their intellectual contri-
bution is more in the realm of epistemology vice policy prescription. That is not
to deny the utility of increased understanding of epistemology, but merely to
note that it is not what policymakers are asking for, and it can be misused too
easily by them.
Crucible of Conflict
The role of ‘the crucible of conflict’ as an alternate influence on policy also helps
to explain the variation in utility of the different groups of literatures discussed in
this article. The three literatures posit causal chains to explain different dependent
variables – tactical/operational doctrine, political and military grand strategy, and
national interests – that are each relevant to states’ ability to survive, and potentially
thrive, in the international system. Of course, each of these is subject to other influ-
ences as well; in particular, material constraints also play a role.
However, in the first two literatures, this material pressure is heavier and more
focused. The choice of military strategies or the selection of a grand strategy to
link means to ends are both issues for which states have a strong incentive to find
the approach most likely to succeed, not that which is most likely to support a



































given ideational construct. Particularly in the areas of tactics and strategy, the ‘cru-
cible of conflict’ is central. Tactics and strategies that disadvantage will have great
and direct costs in blood and treasure. A policy selected for predominantly cultural
reasons in either case will be proven wrong by the material realities of conflict. In
battle, the ideational factors face clear-cut evidence from the adversary and the
result of conflict.79 Preferences in these two areas that were driven by cultural
dynamics will have their limitations laid bare.
This is less the case for the cultural origins of broad national interests literature.
There, the connection between the idea and success in international competition is
most tenuous. While the costs of a war begun by a cultural bias for first strikes are
clear, the implications of a Russian identity that situates itself in Europe rather
than Asia, for instance, is less straightforward.
Relatedly, interests are more fundamental to conceptions of identity (and there-
fore more immutable) than are strategies to achieve those interests. Questions of
‘who we are’ and how do we understand our place in world are more fundamental
than are questions of ‘how ought we secure that place in the world’. The latter pre-
supposes the former, and indeed this is a point of agreement across wide divides.
Both Waltz and Wendt agree: ‘It is important here to distinguish between micro-
and macro-level structures, between what Waltz causes the domains of “foreign
policy” and “international politics”.’80 For Wendt, the macro-level structures are pri-
marily determined by ideas and culture; for Waltz international politics is shaped by
distributions of material capabilities. However for both, actual policy is shaped by
myriad other factors. Similarly, for social identity theory, social purpose if often
an element of identity, but it too describes goals, not the specific strategies to
achieve them.81 In all these cases, the strongest causal arguments are made for the
broader element of identity within a system, rather than the narrower policies to
advance that identity.
Thus, the causal effect of cultural sources from the first two literatures (organiz-
ational culture and strategic culture per se) are likely to have less behavioural conse-
quences as compared to the final (national interest) literature. Material causes will
play a relatively larger role in the first two than in the third.
Taken together then, the previous two sections suggest the causal chain at the core
of the strategic culture literature is squeezed from two sides. In contrast to the nar-
rower work on organization culture, strategic culture (and the constructivist literature
on national interests) suffers from a multiplicity of competing national cultures with
lessons for international security strategies. On the other hand, when such ideas shape
policy in tactical or strategic affairs, they receive feedback as spilled blood and
wasted treasure that is directly attributable to policy choices; the broader conception
of national interests is harder to link to such feedback. Therefore, the cultural ideas
shaping strategic (and tactical) choices are pressured toward optimal strategies.
Thus, despite the stronger link between culture and security variables at either end,
the effect of national cultures on strategic affairs in the middle is weak. It is
subject to each problem, material pressures and the multiplicity of cultures. This
helps to account for the empirical limitations of the strategic culture literature as
outlined in earlier sections.




































As currently developing, weaknesses in the strategic culture project leave it poorly
equipped to serve policy needs. These are substantial shortcomings, and their
causes are not likely to be easily redressed. More dangerously, strategic culture too
often emphasizes stereotypical views of other cultures and ignores the nuance of pol-
itical institutions, geostrategic context, and specific leaders. Two possible remedies
exist. In the first, strategic culture might follow in the footsteps of the constructivist
literature on identity formation, eschewing prediction and focusing on explaining past
strategic preferences. However, what is notable about the constructivist literature is
its diligence in engaging methodological debates. Strategic culture work has done
this only rarely. Engagement in such debates would be beneficial for the field of stra-
tegic culture, laying the groundwork for cumulation of knowledge. However, moving
in this direction would also require inherently an overt move away from claiming
relevance to contemporary policy debates in the near term.
The second path would be even more challenging. Were strategic culture theorists
to acknowledge more often the existence of many competing strategic cultures in
individual polities, empirical accuracy would be achieved. However, this would
then turn those analysts’ attention to models of domestic politics that intermediate
between different competing cultures. That is, if there are three rival cultures addres-
sing a particular country’s broad strategic outlook, then the relevant political insti-
tutions will determine how those cultures shape policy. Understanding these
institutions would be as important as understanding the underlying cultures that
they intermediate among.82 Such an approach may be productive, but it rapidly
becomes complex and draws – primarily – on different literatures than those on
which strategic culture traditionally focuses.
To the extent strategic culture has pointed our attentions towards the importance
of understanding specific cases rather than focusing solely on abstract generic the-
ories of international relations, it has achieved notable success. Understanding the rel-
evant political institutions, identifying the primary societal actors and elites, and
recognizing the constraints and payoffs that motivate action all require specific
knowledge of a case. Indeed, one might accurately refer to this as cultural knowledge.
However, this is not the same as identifying deeply held cultural predispositions for a
particular strategic behaviour.
Despite the success of some historical case work on individual strategic culture in
individual countries and eras, however, policy-relevant work on the subject remains
problematic. While constructivism has raised the profile of academically rigorous
work on culture in general, and the military-organizational culture literature has
developed important prescriptive conclusions, each of these literatures has important
differences from most existing work on strategic culture. Nevertheless, the strategic
culture literature, as it is traditionally conceived, has inappropriately gained legiti-
macy from the successes of similarly situated work on military-organizational cul-
tures and constructivist national identity. Until strategic cultural work addresses
the methodological, theoretical, and empirical problems identified above, it should
be relegated to the second tier of research priorities, perhaps locked in an ivory



































tower away from the seductions of influencing policymakers. Other work, more
amenable to generalization on important policy relevant questions (like military-
organizational culture, but also domestic politics, fine-grained power realism, etc.)
deserves scholarly and national attention instead.
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